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ABSTRACT 
Information and data have always been valuable to businesses, but 
in the Information Age, as businesses have figured out more ways to 
commoditize the information and data they possess, there has been a 
corresponding increase in expressed concerns about the unauthorized 
“disclosure” of information. Often, these concerns are expressed in 
absolute terms, as if any unauthorized disclosure of information 
* Robins-Kaplan LLP Distinguished Professor of IP Law and Director of the IP Institute at Mitchell 
Hamline School of Law. The ideas expressed in this article were first set forth with respect to trade
secret law in my article, “Lost in the Cloud? Information Flows and the Implications of Cloud
Computing for Trade Secret Protection”, Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud? Information Flows 
and the Implications of Cloud Computing for Trade Secret Protection 19 Va. J.  L. & Tech. 1 (2014). 
A version of this article under the title “Disclosure” is included as a chapter in the Research Guide to 
Information Law (Sandeen, Rademacher, Ohly eds.) published by Edward Elgar in 2021. I am grateful 
to Edward Elgar for allowing me to re-publish that work in this form. I am also grateful for the
assistance of the research librarians at MHSL and my research assistants, Joseph Dietz, Akina Khan, 
and Trenton Seegert, and for feedback I received at the Trade Secret Scholars Workshop hosted by
Washington & Lee University in February 2020 and the IP Scholars Workshop hosted by the
University of Akron in December of 2020.
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constitutes an act of unfair competition or theft. The problem is that the 
common understanding of disclosure, particularly among information 
owners that seek to restrict access to the information they possess, belies 
the legal meaning of the term as used in various contexts.  
Sometimes, but not as often as information owners/possessors assert, 
the disclosure of information will result in the loss of associated rights in 
the information, but other times it will not. This can happen, for instance, 
when no legal rights attach to a specified body of information, or when 
any rights that do attach (like copyrights) continue to exist even if there is 
a disclosure of the information. 
Because different areas of information law have developed different 
meanings of the term disclosure (and related terms, like “publication”), 
it is important for scholars, courts, and litigants to understand those 
meanings and use them properly. Otherwise, there is a risk that claims of 
wrongful disclosure of information will unduly influence policymakers 
and judges to favor the claims of information owners/possessors over 
those who are entitled to access and use the subject information. In other 
words, the limitations that exist on the scope of various information rights 
should not be overshadowed by the rhetoric of loss and theft when no such 
loss or theft is possible. 
This article begins by first illustrating the different ways that the term 
“disclosure” is used in law, using trade secret law, patent law, and 
copyright law as case studies. It concludes by setting forth a typology of 
disclosure that should be used to explain the legal consequences of acts 
of disclosure for various types of information. Only Type-L disclosures 
(those that result in the loss of associated information rights) fit the 
rhetoric of information owners/possessors.   
I. INTRODUCTION
The discourse surrounding information and data,1 and claimed rights 
therein, is often expressed as a binary choice between confidentiality or 
secrecy on one hand and disclosure or publication (and the loss of 
associated rights) on the other. Typically, the owners/holders of 
confidential information assert that their rights and interests will be 
destroyed if “their” information is disclosed and accordingly,2 that courts 
1. The word “information” is used throughout the remainder of this paper to refer to both
information and data, as data is a type of information.  
2. Because information is not always considered to be property, and even when it is the person 
or company that asserts the property rights may not own those rights, it is important not to 
automatically attribute the status of ownership to information holders. Thus, “owners/holders” is used 
2
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should act to protect those rights by preventing any disclosure. In addition, 
when the information is characterized as property, the actual or threatened 
act of disclosure is often described as theft or destruction of property. Seen 
in this light, the word disclosure is a loaded term in information law 
discourse with rhetorical power that can obscure the real issues in dispute. 
The principal reason why the word disclosure is a loaded term is due 
to its commonly understood meaning, a meaning that is often different 
from the applicable legal definition. Commonly understood and used, the 
word disclosure is thought to connote a public revelation of some type or 
a dedication of the information to the public, but the dictionary and legal 
definitions of disclosure do not always require such publicness. Indeed, in 
many situations it is possible for information to be disclosed to another, 
including government officials, without the information becoming public. 
Thus, in many areas of information law3 the applicable definitions of 
disclosure (or publication) are inconsistent with a binary choice between 
legal protection or loss of rights; rather, there is a middle ground. In fact, 
the word disclosure is frequently used in different senses within one area 
of law. 
Within different fields of information law, the word disclosure may 
be a term of art with a meaning that does not comport with any dictionary 
definitions or the meaning commonly ascribed to it by information 
owners/holders. Understanding the meaning of disclosure in information 
law is further complicated by the fact that, although litigants and courts 
frequently characterize various acts as disclosures, often the subject 
statutes do not use that word. For instance, in copyright law it is more 
common to use the word publication.4 Similar words might also be used, 
including “shared,” “sharing,” and “transferred.” Making matters worse, 
the word disclosure is not always defined by statutes that use it and there 
are multiple dictionary meanings of the word that are used in different 
contexts. 
Because of the different uses, meanings, and legal effects of both the 
word disclosure and the effects of an act of disclosure throughout 
throughout this article to acknowledge this critical factual issue. In many cases, mere holders of 
information do not have any standing to complain about the actual or threatened loss of the 
information.   
3. As used herein, “information law” concerns the laws that govern how information (broadly 
defined) is created, collected, organized, protected, secured, accessed, shared, transmitted used, and 
discarded by businesses and governments. It also concerns related public policy issues that should 
inform policymaking, primarily the public interests in information access, diffusion, and transparency 
and each of our individual interests in information privacy. See SHARON K. SANDEEN & DAVID S. 
LEVINE, INFO. LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND CYBERSECURITY, 39 (West Academic 2019). 
4. See infra, Part III.
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information law, it is important for all—but particularly those who own 
or hold information, their lawyers, and the judges who consider 
information-related cases—to exercise care when talking about 
information disclosure. At least five questions should be answered: (1) 
What is the claimed act of disclosure and does it involve an element of 
publicness?; (2) What is the information that is (or will be) subject to the 
act of disclosure?; (3) Is the information factually confidential or secret?; 
(4) What is the applicable common law or statutory meaning of disclosure, 
if any?; and (5) If an act of disclosure occurs as defined, what is the legal
effect of that act? Importantly, if the information is not confidential or
secret then questions (4) and (5) need not be answered because the general
rule is that information once revealed to the public is free for anyone to
use.5 Rather, with respect to such information, the relevant question is
whether the publicly disclosed information is protected under law—for
instance, patent or copyright law—such that its use is limited.
Given the breadth of information law, it is not possible in this 
relatively short article to answer each of the questions posed above with 
respect to all the areas of law where disclosure is discussed. Nor is it 
possible to engage in an in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence of 
disclosure in the areas of law that are discussed. Rather, the purpose of 
this article is to illustrate how concepts of disclosure are used and defined 
in different information law settings in order to highlight the need for the 
proposed typology of disclosure. Importantly, it will show that concepts 
of disclosure in information law are sometimes narrower or broader than 
the prevalent meaning ascribed to the word by information 
owners/holders. It also explains why it is important to understand and 
properly apply the different meanings of disclosure. 
Understanding the different meanings of disclosure used in 
information law is important for the simple reason that not all information 
is protected by law. Thus, concerns regarding the loss of information 
rights due to acts of disclosure should never arise with respect to 
information for which protection is unavailable or nonexistent. For 
instance, this can occur when an information owner/holder claims rights 
5. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 624 (1834) (“An individual who thus mingles what cannot 
be exclusively enjoyed, with what can, does, upon familiar principles, rather forfeit the power over 
his own peculiar work, than throw the chain around that which is of itself as free as air.”); Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1989) (“Once an inventor has decided to 
lift the veil of secrecy from his work, he must choose the protection of a federal patent or the 
dedication of his idea to the public at large.”).  
4
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in information that is: (1) not factually confidential or secret;6 (2) is in the 
public domain; or (3) constitutes prior art. However, if some information 
rights attach to a given body of information, there are four principal senses 
in which the word disclosure is used in information law cases. 
First, the word disclosure is often used to describe an action that 
results in the loss of applicable legal protections in the subject 
information. This is how plaintiffs in trade secret cases, litigants seeking 
a protective order, and companies opposing freedom of information 
requests typically describe the consequences of them sharing information 
with another. But in some areas of information law, the disclosure of 
information does not result in the loss of related information rights. For 
instance, although there are various legal consequences associated with 
the publication of copyright-protected works,7 the copyrights in published 
works are not destroyed as a result of the disclosure of the work.8 There 
may be other reasons to treat such information as confidential or subject 
to a protective order, but it wouldn’t be because of a loss of rights due to 
the disclosure of the copyright-protected content. Even under trade secret 
law, it is possible for information to be shared with another person or 
wrongfully acquired without a loss of trade secret rights, for instance, 
when it is shared (some would say “disclosed”) pursuant to a duty of 
confidentiality. 
Second, the word disclosure is often used to describe actions that 
result in the public dissemination of information. However, as just noted, 
6. As explained more fully in Part III, even confidential and secret information may not be
protected by law unless it meets the other two requirements of trade secrecy. That is because the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), applicable in nearly all U.S. states, precludes any other tort or 
equitable claims related to confidential or secret information except a trade secret or breach of contract 
claim. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 7, 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2018) [hereinafter the UTSA].  
Although primarily used in discussions of copyright law, the classic definition of “the public domain” 
is information that is unprotected by intellectual property (IP) law. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, 
Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 Law & Contemporary Probs. 
147, 149 (2003) (defining the public domain as “a sphere in which contents are free from intellectual 
property rights”). This could include information that can never be protected by a form of IP (see, 
e.g., Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1501 (2020) (discussing the government 
edicts doctrine which holds that certain works are ineligible for copyright protection) or information 
for which applicable protections have ended (see, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 
446 (2015), referring to a “post-expiration . . . public domain.”). However, as further explained
below, just because information enters the public domain doesn’t necessarily mean that it has been
publicly disclosed. See infra note 14. 
7. See Deborah Gerhardt, Copyright at the Museum: Using the Publication Doctrine to Free
Art and History, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S. 393–451 (2014); Deborah Gerhardt, Copyright 
Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 135 (2011).  
8. As explained in Part III, C, before March 1, 1989 in the U.S., publication of a copyright 
protected work without a proper copyright notice resulted in a loss of copyrights, but the act of 
publication was typically at the behest of the copyright owner. 
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whether these actions result in the loss of associated information rights 
depends upon the type of information rights, if any, that attach to the 
subject information. The public dissemination of information will destroy 
trade secret rights, confidentiality, and some privacy interests, but these 
are not always the types of behaviors that are at issue in information law 
cases. Some rights in information, principally patent rights and 
copyrights, continue to exist despite the public dissemination of the 
information and depending upon the nature and scope of the 
dissemination. Conversely, some rights in information cease to exist even 
if the information is not “publicly” disseminated, for instance when 
inventors commercialize their secret inventions without timely filing for 
a patent9 and when copyrights expire for unpublished works.10 In these 
situations, rights in information can be lost even if the information is not 
publicly disclosed. 
Third, the acts of disclosures that are at issue in information law cases 
often involve the sharing of information between the information 
owner/holder and another that does not result in the public dissemination 
of the information or, in trade secret parlance, that does not make the 
information “generally known” among the public or within an industry. 
Once again, whether the information that is shared continues to enjoy the 
legal protections that attach to it, if any, depends upon the type of 
information involved and whether it was shared in the context of a 
relationship that gives rise to a duty of confidentiality. If the information 
was protected by copyright or patent rights, the fact that the information 
was shared will not adversely affect those rights. The sharing of 
confidential information without first establishing a duty of 
confidentiality, however, can undermine trade secret protection, privacy 
rights, and the ability to claim that the information is confidential. 
Relatedly, when we say that information “enters the public domain”11 or 
9. See the “forfeiture doctrine” of Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & AP Co., 
153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) and Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 139 S. 
Ct. 628 (2019).  
10. As explained in Part III, C before the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act on January 
1, 1978, copyrights in the U.S. were acquired by either publication or registration of the work, but in 
both cases, the works were disclosed in the sense that they became available to the public. Since 
January 1, 1978, unpublished original works of authorship that are fixed in tangible form are 
automatically protected by U.S. copyright law for the prescribed term. At the end of such term, they 
technically enter the public domain in the sense that they are no longer protected by copyright law, 
but there is no requirement that they be publicly disclosed.  
11. Like the word “disclosure,” the term “public domain” is often misused to refer to
information that is publicly disclosed, but this is not its common technical meaning. Also, although 
primarily used in copyright law, conceptually it has a broader application. It is frequently referred to 
as “the body of ideas and works that are not subject to intellectual property protection.” Tyler T. 
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“becomes prior art,” it does not necessarily mean that the information has 
been publicly disclosed. Under both patent and copyright law, information 
may cease being protected even if it is not publicly disclosed.12 
Fourth, sometimes the word disclosure is used when the more apt 
word would be “transferred.” In these situations, the word disclosed is 
used to describe the transfer of information from one location to another, 
for instance, when it is stored on the computer server of a company that 
provides cloud storage solutions or in boxes in a climate-controlled 
warehouse.13 In these cases, the information is technically available to be 
accessed by the storage providers and, in that sense, the information has 
been shared with them. But, if the storage providers do not access and read 
the information, the information arguably has not been disclosed in a 
manner that allows for human (or even machine) cognition. Also, this 
shared information typically is not disclosed to the public. 
There are obvious policy choices involved in whether and how 
various acts of disclosure waive applicable legal rights in the subject 
information, with the third-party doctrine of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence under U.S. law being an obvious example.14 This article 
does not address those policy choices. Rather, taking the law and policy 
choices as they currently are, it advocates for greater clarity concerning 
the types and ranges of disclosures that are at issue in information law 
cases. Clearly, not all acts of disclosure are treated as a loss of rights. How 
then should we label these types of disclosure to differentiate them from 
disclosures that do result in a loss of rights? And what do we call acts that 
fall somewhere between the two extremes, allowing for the sharing or 
transfer of information under conditions that do not result in the loss of 
applicable information rights? Finally, how should we label information 
that is not protected by law such that no type of disclosure matters from a 
legal perspective? 
To sort out the different meanings, uses, and effects of information 
disclosing acts, this article proposes a typology of disclosure that will 
allow litigants, judges, scholars, and policymakers to more easily 
differentiate between acts that result in disclosures of information that 
Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 217 (2002). See 
also, Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (2003) (defining the public domain as “a sphere in which contents are 
free from intellectual property rights”).   
12. See infra, Part III.
13. Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud? Information Flows and the Implications of Cloud
Computing for Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2014). 
14. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561
(2009). 
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result in the loss of associated rights, and those that do not.15 As further 
explained in Part IV, it specifies five different types of disclosure, 
denominated with letters that correspond with the legal protection, if any, 
that the information possesses following the corresponding act of 
disclosure. The five types are: (1) Type-L for acts of disclosure that result 
in the loss (L) of rights in the subject information; (2) Type-P for acts of 
disclosure that do not result in a loss of rights because the information 
remains protected (P) notwithstanding being disclosed; (3) Type-C for 
information disclosures made to a person or entity who is under a duty of 
confidentiality (C), therefore not resulting in a loss of rights; (4) Type-T 
for information that is merely transferred (T) from one physical or digital 
location to another, but in a way that does not involve the exercise of 
human cognition by the recipient and holder of the information such that 
they gain any information or knowledge from the disclosure; and (5) 
Type-X disclosures that concern acts related to information that, due to 
the various limitations of information law, is not protected by law. An 
important proviso is that some information, and particularly compilations 
of information, may involve multiple types of information and 
disclosures. 
The article begins in Part II with a discussion of the meaning of 
disclosure from various dictionaries, showing how there are different 
definitions and how those definitions do not always comport with the 
common assertions of information owners/holders. Part III discusses the 
various ways that disclosure (or publication) is used in three different 
fields of information law: trade secret law, patent law, and copyright law. 
In Part IV, the proposed typology of disclosure is further explained. Part 
V provides suggestions for how the typology should be used in practice 
and, in so doing, demonstrates that information owners/holders should not 
always fear the disclosure of the information they own or hold. The article 
concludes with Part VI. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court is apt to emphasize, particularly of late, that 
in the absence of a definition in the statute itself, words in a statute should 
15. This article pays homage to two earlier works: Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital
Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.147 (2003) and Daniel J. 
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006). Both articles addressed a common 
problem in legal discourse and information law; namely, the need to understand and define terms and 
concepts and use them precisely and consistently. It is only then that a discussion of applicable legal 
consequences and policy choices are possible.   
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be given their common meanings and that a dictionary from the time when 
the statute was enacted is a good source for that meaning.16 A stated 
reason for this approach is that when a statute does not define a term it 
should be assumed that the legislators intended the common meaning, and 
to attribute a different meaning to the term would amount to judicial 
lawmaking. But there are several problems with this approach, which even 
the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged. First, when you look up a 
word in the dictionary it often has several meanings and, thus, how does 
one know which meaning was intended by the legislators?17 Moreover, 
which of many possible dictionaries did the legislators have in mind, since 
there is no official dictionary of the United States?18 To answer these 
questions, the Supreme Court often looks for clues elsewhere, for 
instance, by reading the word in the context of the entire statute,19 
considering the purpose of the statute,20 or looking (often reluctantly) at 
legislative history.21 The Court might also look to industry-specific 
dictionaries for meaning, like Black’s Law Dictionary, even if it is not 
clear that the legislators were familiar with those specialized 
dictionaries.22 
Looking up the meaning of “disclosure” illustrates the confusion that 
dictionary definitions can cause when interpreting a statute that uses the 
term. According to most dictionaries, the word disclosure connotes some 
form of revelation, but how much and to whom they really do not say. For 
instance, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines disclosure as “an act or 
instance of disclosing: EXPOSURE” or “something disclosed; 
REVELATION.”23 Similarly, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, 
16. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (“The 
term [], being left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning.”); Perrin v. United States, 
444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute”). See also, 
Mark A. Lemley, Chief Justice Webster, 106 IOWA L. REV. 299 (2020) (describing the Supreme 
Court’s recent turn toward dictionaries to determine the “ordinary meaning” of words in statutes).  
17. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 241–42 
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that a different definition from one of the same 
dictionaries used by the majority would allow for a different ruling, stating: “The Court seizes upon 
a particular sense of the word ‘modify’ at the expense of another, long-established meaning that fully 
supports the Commission’s position.”). 
18. Id. at 225–28 (debating which dictionary definitions are applicable to the statute). 
19. See United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 
371 (1988). 
20. Id. at 373–74. 
21. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 477 U.S. 102, 110–16 
(1980) (using legislative history to refute petitioner’s interpretation of a statute). 
22. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp., 512 U.S. at 225 (1994). 
23. Disclosure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (10th ed. 1995). 
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disclosure is defined as “the act or process of making known something 
that was previously unknown; a revelation of facts.”24 The word exposure 
is defined by Merriam-Webster to include “the condition of being 
presented to view or made known.” Similarly, the word revelation is 
defined, in one sense, as “the act of revealing to view or making known.”25 
But none of these definitions say anything about the relative publicness of 
the disclosed, exposed, or revealed information. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) definition, on the other hand, 
alludes to the disclosure as making information publicly known, defining 
disclosure as “the action or fact of disclosing or revealing new or secret 
information; the action of making something openly known.”26 However, 
even here there is nothing defining how widely known the disclosure has 
to be to be “openly known.” Importantly, the OED also notes that 
disclosure is often used attributively as “designating documents in which 
a formal or legal statement is made disclosing certain information, or legal 
processes in which such a declaration is required; as disclosure form, 
disclosure hearing, disclosure statement, etc.”27 Numerous federal and 
state statutes and regulations require such disclosures to designated 
persons or entities, but not always including the general public. 
Because none of the foregoing definitions identify to whom the 
information is disclosed or how broadly it must be revealed, the dictionary 
definitions of disclosure are largely inconsistent with the views of many 
information owners/holders that disclosure means making information 
available to the public when, in fact, only the word disclosure preceded 
by the adjective “publicly” does. Even then, however, what disclosure 
means in different areas of information law often differs from both the 
dictionary definitions of disclosure and the common understanding of 
publicly disclosed. Sometimes, for important public policy reasons, 
certain information is treated as disclosed or publicly disclosed even 
though it is only revealed to a select few or is revealed to no one; in effect, 
being treated as constructively disclosed to the public even if it was never 
actually disclosed to the public. These specialized meanings as used in 
certain fields are what are known as “terms of art” and they are prevalent 
in law. 
The fact that certain fields, including law, frequently use terms of art 
highlights the importance of specialized dictionaries in some instances 
24. Disclosure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
25. Exposure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (10th ed. 1995); Revelation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (10th ed. 
1995).  
26. Disclosure, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
27. Id. 
10
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and explains why they are sometimes consulted to give meaning to 
statutory words. However, context matters. For instance, under U.S. 
patent claim construction jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit rejected 
reliance on dictionary definitions in favor of applicable technical 
definitions in the patent claims and specifications (intrinsic evidence) or, 
secondarily, in specialized dictionaries and treatises (extrinsic 
evidence).28 Similarly, when statutes use terminology that had a common 
law meaning at the time the statute was enacted, U.S. courts often apply 
the common law definition of the terms even if they do not comport with 
applicable dictionary definitions.29 Justice Gorsuch acknowledged as 
much in the Argus Leader decision when he listed “dictionary definitions, 
early case law, or any other usual source” as possible sources for the 
meaning of undefined words in a statute.30 Because statutory words often 
have specialized meanings in a particular field of law, it is important to 
understand what those meanings are and apply them correctly. 
III. THE MANY MEANINGS OF DISCLOSURE IN INFORMATION LAW
There are many areas of law where questions concerning the
disclosure of information arise. For instance, every time an individual or 
business is required to provide information to a governmental entity, 
information is shared and potentially made available to the public 
pursuant to freedom of information acts and sunshine laws. When an 
individual or business initiates a lawsuit, applicable rules of pleading, 
discovery, and evidence require lots of information to be exchanged 
between the litigants and filed with the court. The information that 
businesses require customers and clients to provide raises important 
concerns about the privacy of the disclosed (or shared) information. While 
laws and regulations exist that require or enable certain types of 
information to be kept from public disclosure under specified conditions 
(for instance, Protective Orders31), there are also many laws and legal 
principles in the U.S. and elsewhere that encourage and facilitate the 
disclosure of information to the public. U.S. patent law32 and the U.S. 
28. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020); See, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (en banc). See also, Mark A. Lemley, Chief Justice Webster, 106 IOWA L. REV. 299 (2020).  
29. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 162 (2014) (“It is a settled principle of
interpretation that, absent other indication, ‘Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning 
of the common-law terms it uses.’”); See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 739–740 (1989) (applying the common law definition of “employee”).  
30. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (2019). 
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
32. See infra, Part III, B.
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Freedom of Information Act33 are two obvious examples. All these laws 
and regulations constitute what is referred to herein as “information law,” 
but to illustrate how the word disclosure can be used and defined 
differently in different legal contexts, this article focuses on the following 
three areas of information law: trade secret law, patent law, and copyright 
law. 
A. Trade Secret Law
Trade secret law in the U.S. was developed at common law but is
now largely governed by two statutes which incorporate most of the 
common law principles: (1) The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) 
which has been adopted by 48 states, and (2) the federal Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA).34 Both statutes use the word “disclose” in 
the definition of misappropriation to describe one of three acts that may 
subject someone to liability for trade secret misappropriation, the other 
two being “acquisition” and “use.”35 However, nowhere in the UTSA or 
the DTSA is the word disclose defined. Rather, as the caselaw has 
developed, disclose for purposes of trade secret misappropriation means 
an act by the defendant that results in the subject information losing its 
trade secret protection, and not acts whereby information is shared 
pursuant to obligations of confidentiality.36 This is because it is the loss 
of trade secret protection that is one type of harm upon which remedies 
for trade secret misappropriation can be measured.37 
Often in trade secret cases, the meaning of disclose for 
misappropriation purposes never becomes an issue in the case because the 
plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a trade secret in the first instance. 
Unfortunately, this is a situation where the words disclose or disclosure 
are often used but with varying meanings that do not always comport with 
dictionary meanings, and where the legal effect of the acts of disclosure 
vary depending upon the circumstances. Thus, to understand the concept 
of disclosure in trade secret law, and when it is appropriate to use the word 
33. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
34. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error 
When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010); Sharon 
K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward A Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017).
35. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(2). 
36. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1 cmt. (“Because the trade secret can be destroyed through public 
knowledge, the unauthorized disclosure of a trade secret is also a misappropriation.”). 
37. The other type of potential harm upon which remedies for trade secret misappropriation
can be measured relates to the unauthorized use of the trade secrets. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(2). 
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disclosure to connote a loss of trade secrecy (a Type-L disclosure), 
requires an understanding of the definition of a trade secret. Moreover, as 
will be seen, whether an act is a disclosure that results in a loss of trade 
secrecy often depends upon who is engaging in those acts: the putative 
trade secret owner, the misappropriator, or a third party. To differentiate 
between these circumstances, care must be taken not to use the word 
disclosure unless a loss of trade secrecy results or to identify and label the 
type of disclosure that is involved pursuant to the typology that is set forth 
in this article. 
For instance, a plaintiff in a trade secret case, rather than speaking 
generally about disclosure would say, “I fear a Type-L disclosure that will 
result in a loss of trade secret rights.” The defendant might respond, 
“There is no risk of a Type-L disclosure because the subject information 
is either otherwise protected by law (a Type-P disclosure) or will only be 
disclosed pursuant to a protective order (a Type-C disclosure).” Or the 
defendant might challenge the plaintiff’s assertion of trade secrecy and 
argue that the disclosure of the information would be a Type-X disclosure 
because the information is not protected by any type of information law. 
Under both the UTSA and the DTSA, information is not protected as 
a trade secret unless it meets three requirements. First, the information 
cannot be “generally known or readily ascertainable.”38 As is further 
explained below, this requirement equates most with public perceptions 
of disclosure, but it alone does not determine trade secrecy. In addition, 
the subject information must have independent economic value because 
of its secrecy and be of value to others.39 The information must also be 
the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.40 
With regard to the first requirement, trade secret protection is not 
available for information that has already been made public either by the 
putative trade secret owner or another (including a misappropriator) such 
that it becomes “generally known.”41 Moreover, under longstanding trade 
secret doctrine, generally known information has a broad definition that 
includes that which is known to the general public (the common 
understanding of publicly disclosed), as well as that which is known 
within discrete industries.42 Additionally, while common definitions of 
38. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(4)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B). 
39. Id. 
40. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(4)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A).
41. Kewanee Oil. Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479–80 (1974). 
42. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1 cmt. (“The language ‘not being generally known to and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons’ does not require that information be 
generally known to the public for trade secret rights to be lost. If the principal persons who can obtain 
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disclosure are often equated with public dissemination, the concept that 
information is not a trade secret if it is “readily ascertainable” does not 
require broad public dissemination.43 Rather, it recognizes that 
information may not be generally known by the public or within an 
industry, but still is effectively disclosed for trade secret purposes if it can 
be easily found in publicly accessible materials such as scientific journals, 
books, or on websites. This is true even if no one has actually accessed 
the information.44 Generally, the ease with which information is 
discoverable (or knowable) is the dividing line between whether 
information loses its trade secret status immediately upon becoming 
ascertainable, or whether it only loses its trade secret status when it has 
actually been found or reversed engineered and thereafter made generally 
known.45 
Based on the foregoing, the word disclosure can be used in trade 
secret litigation in at least four different senses. First, it can determine the 
consequences of a misappropriator’s actions; namely, whether an act of 
misappropriation occurred because the defendant disclosed the subject 
information as prohibited by the UTSA’s and DTSA’s definition of 
misappropriation. This type of disclosure requires an act that results in the 
loss of trade secrecy, which means that the information becomes generally 
known or readily ascertainable because of the misappropriator’s actions. 
Second, the word disclosure is often used in trade secret cases to refer 
to acts that lead to information becoming generally known, which is 
consistent with the common understanding of disclosure as connoting 
public dissemination. But as previously noted, disclosure resulting in a 
loss of trade secrecy can occur even without the widespread dissemination 
or availability of the alleged trade secrets, so long as the information is 
generally known within the relevant industry or, if not, is readily 
ascertainable by the general public or the relevant industry. 
economic benefit from information are aware of it, there is no trade secret. A method of casting metal, 
for example, may be unknown to the general public but readily known within the foundry industry.”).  
43. See UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(4)(i), cmt. Some states, most notably California, do not
analyze the ascertainability of information as part of plaintiff’s prima facie proof of trade secrecy, but 
rather, frame the issue as a defense. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (Deering 1994). This distinction 
does not affect the current discussion, however, because it concerns the broader and more abstract 
issue of what constitutes “disclosed” information under trade secret law.  
44. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1 cmt.  (“Information is readily ascertainable if it is available in 
trade journals, reference books, or published materials.”).  
45. Weins v. Sporleder, 569 N.W.2d 16, 21 (S.D. 1997) (quoting Computer Care v. Serv. Sys. 
Enterprises, Inc., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992)) (“[I]f the information can be readily duplicated 
without involving considerable time, effort or expense, then it is not secret.”). 
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Third, disclosure in the trade secret sense can mean that the 
information has become readily ascertainable, which means something 
different from generally known but which has the same legal effect as if 
the information was publicly disclosed. Because this information, by 
definition, is not generally known, plaintiffs in trade secret cases typically 
believe it is still a trade secret, not understanding that the information 
could have been made readily ascertainable by a third party. This might 
happen, for instance, where the plaintiff keeps information secret, but a 
third party independently develops the same information and reveals it in 
their PhD thesis which becomes a part of a library’s catalogue of 
accessible works. Importantly, unlike patent law where the relevant prior 
art is defined as of a specific date, under trade secret law, the status of 
information as a trade secret can change at any time as information 
becomes generally known and readily ascertainable. 
Lastly, disclosure in trade secret cases can connote actions by the 
putative trade secret owner that trigger the requirement to engage in 
reasonable efforts to keep the information secret, even if the subject 
information does not become generally known or readily ascertainable. 
This happens, for instance, when a trade secret owner decides to use its 
trade secrets in its business or share it with others outside the business. In 
trying to meet the reasonable efforts requirement, putative trade secret 
owners will often argue that their information was kept secret and never 
disclosed. But due to the particularities of the reasonable efforts 
requirement, how a putative trade secret owner handles its information 
may result in it not being protected as a trade secret even if the information 
is never publicly disclosed. That is because secret information is not 
deemed a trade secret unless reasonable efforts were engaged in to keep it 
secret. One reason for this rule is the notice function of the reasonable 
efforts requirement which generally requires efforts that are sufficient to 
put the recipients and users of trade secret information on notice of 
applicable confidentiality obligations. 
While the acts of a putative trade secret owner often result in 
disclosure such that the information becomes generally known or readily 
ascertainable, the public availability of the information is not required 
when a trade secret owner voluntarily transfers information to a third party 
without first establishing a duty of confidentiality.46 This is due to the 
46. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (first quoting Harrington v. Natl. 
Outdoor Advertising Co., 196 S.W.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1946); then quoting MILGRIM ON TRADE 
SECRETS § 1.01[2] (1983)) (“If an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no 
obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the secret, 
his property right is extinguished.”). 
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various functions of the reasonable efforts requirement, including its 
notice, due process, and legitimacy functions.47 A broad definition of 
disclosure with respect to voluntary, non-accidental owner-initiated acts 
is also consistent with notions of fairness and judicial efficiency; fairness 
in giving those who might be found responsible for misappropriating trade 
secrets advance notice of their obligations and judicial efficiency in not 
clogging the courts with litigation to protect information that its 
owner/holder did not take steps to protect. Thus, if such information is 
misappropriated, there is no trade secret claim even if the information is 
otherwise secret. 
When used in these different senses, the word disclosure can lead to 
confusion in trade secret cases because the legal meaning of the term is 
different from the common or dictionary meanings. As noted, a trade 
secrecy destroying disclosure does not require public disclosure as that 
term is used in common or dictionary vernacular. Instead, the information 
will be deemed unprotectable information if: (1) it was generally known, 
even if only among those in a discrete industry; (2) it is readily 
ascertainable; (3) it does not have economic value due to its secrecy; or 
(4) it was not the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.
Thus, the information may be confidential in a factual sense, but it is not
a qualifying trade secret the disclosure of which we care about in the
absence of an enforceable contractual duty of confidence. But then the
claim is for breach of contract, not trade secret misappropriation.48
Further complicating the meaning of disclosure under trade secret 
law is the frequent desire of putative trade secret owners not to have acts 
of misappropriation treated as trade secrecy destroying disclosures. 
Where trade secrets exist and their wrongful acquisition, disclosure, or use 
is suspected, trade secret owners should act quickly to prevent any trade 
secrecy destroying acts of disclosure or use by obtaining appropriate 
injunctive relief; the goal being to prevent the information from becoming 
generally known or readily ascertainable. If dissemination of the subject 
47. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The 
remedial significance of such efforts lies in the fact that if the plaintiff has allowed his trade secret to 
fall into the public domain, he would enjoy a windfall if permitted to recover damages merely because 
the defendant took the secret from him, rather than from the public domain as it could have done with 
impunity.” (Internal citations omitted)); See, e.g., Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pac. Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 366 
N.W.2d 366, 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that reasonable efforts of plaintiff technology 
company including contract terms and proprietary notice clearly establish that defendant employees 
were aware of trade secret status of contested software development). 
48. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 7 (limiting claims for the misappropriation of competitively
significant confidential information to breach of contract and trade secret misappropriation claims).  
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information by the alleged misappropriator did occur, the question arises 
whether there was a trade secrecy destroying disclosure. 
Many courts have held that the acts of misappropriators do not 
constitute trade secrecy destroying disclosures unless the trade secrets 
become generally known or readily ascertainable.49 This may be true even 
if the information was widely shared and used within the 
misappropriator’s company. This approach makes sense from a policy 
perspective because it provides a window of time in which a trade secret 
owner can attempt to protect its rights following acts of 
misappropriation.50 Typically, this would include an injunction addressed 
to all the people known to have possessed or used the trade secret. But it 
also demonstrates how acts that would be considered trade secrecy 
destroying disclosures when committed by a putative trade secret owner 
may not be treated the same way when committed by a misappropriator. 
Another form of disclosure which tends not to be treated harshly 
under trade secret law, but which nonetheless often results in the loss of 
trade secrecy, concerns accidental disclosures. According to longstanding 
trade secret doctrine, a trade secret owner who accidentally discloses trade 
secrets to a third party may be able to avoid the trade secrecy disqualifying 
effects of their inadvertence if the information did not become generally 
known or readily ascertainable and they act quickly to prevent further 
dissemination of the information.51 Pursuant to the UTSA, the third party 
possessor of accidentally acquired information may be liable for trade 
secret misappropriation unless the third party changed its position before 
receiving notice of the accidental disclosure.52 Thus, in situations where 
notice is timely received by the third party, the accidental disclosure of 
the information to the third party in a manner that does not make the 
information generally known or readily ascertainable is not counted as a 
trade secrecy waiving event.53 
Both of the foregoing examples may be labeled Type-C disclosures 
because although there was an act of disclosure whereby trade secret 
49. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp.
1231, 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
50. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through
Sequential Preservation, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (2007); 2007 B.C. INTEL. PROP. & TECH F. 091101 
(2007) (discussing cases of trade secrets that end up in the hands of third parties who are not the 
original misappropriators and proposing an analytical framework for preserving such trades secrets 
in some situations where they have subsequently been disclosed).  
51. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 758 (1939). 
52. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(2)(ii)(C). See also MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 7.02[2][b]. 
53. Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (analyzing effect of inadvertent disclosure 
made in e-discovery context).  
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information was disclosed to or shared with someone other than the trade 
secret owner, the recipients of the information were under a duty not to 
further disclose that information; in other words, to keep it confidential. 
In the case of the misappropriation, disclosure is a proscribed wrong under 
trade secret law. In the case of an accidental disclosure, a duty of 
confidentiality can be imposed with timely notice. 
Sometimes trade secret rights are lost, not due to actions of the 
putative trade secret owner, but pursuant to the proper actions of others; 
for instance, if others acquire the trade secrets through reverse engineering 
or independent development and then disclose them.54 This is another 
situation where trade secret plaintiffs will proclaim that they never 
disclosed the information, which may be true, but it does not matter. If a 
third party’s acts of reverse engineering and independent development are 
followed by a disclosure of the resulting information in a manner that 
makes it generally known or readily ascertainable, then the putative trade 
secret owner’s trade secret rights in the same information cease to exist. 
A key reason for this rule is that the ability of individuals and companies 
to engage in reverse engineering and independent development is what 
differentiates trade secret protection from patent protection, thereby 
furthering the public disclosure goals of patent law and, in the U.S., 
preventing trade secret law from being preempted by federal patent law.55 
It is also consistent with the general goal of promoting the dissemination 
of information and the flourishing of public knowledge. 
B. Patent Law
The U.S. Patent Act uses the word disclosure more than 40 times, but
as with the UTSA and the DTSA, it is not defined in the statute.56 Also, 
like trade secret law, U.S. patent law employs different conceptions of 
disclosure and publicness depending upon the context in which the issue 
arises and who is doing the disclosing. In nearly all cases where it is used, 
the word disclosure is used without the adjective “public” and, when read 
in the context of the statutory provisions where the word appears, its usage 
is most consistent with a disclosing act that does not necessarily or 
54. See MILGRIM, supra note 52 (describing the non-liability of the “honest” discoverer). 
55. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
56. Although there are two versions of the U.S. Patent Act which may apply to issued U.S.
patents depending upon whether the corresponding patent applications were filed pre- or post- the 
effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), this analysis focuses on the AIA 
version.  
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immediately make the information public. The provisions of the Patent 
Act that are known as the Bayh-Dole Act provide one example of this; 
there, disclosure is used to refer to acts by which a federally-funded 
inventor discloses (shares) their invention to the federal government, but 
under circumstances where the information is kept confidential (a Type-
C disclosure).57 Similarly, under the provisions of the Patent Act dealing 
with the ability of the federal government to withhold the publication of 
patents for national security purposes, disclosure is used to refer to the 
exchange of information between the inventor and the federal 
government, and not to the dissemination of the information to the 
public.58 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 122, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) is required to keep patent applications 
confidential except as specified, making those that are not published 
subject to a statutory duty of confidence. 
Under the Patent Act, the dissemination of patent information to the 
public arises in two contexts: (1) the requirements for patentability, 
particularly 35 U.S.C. § 112, that require patent applicants to disclose 
specified and detailed information to the USPTO; and (2) the rules 
governing the publication of issued patents and their related 
applications.59 It is with respect to the publication of issued patents and 
applications where the information owner’s common understanding of the 
word disclosure as meaning public disclosure applies because once a 
patent is granted (and in many cases, 18 months after the application is 
filed), the details of the issued patent (or application) is published in the 
USPTO’s Official Gazette.60 Indeed, the grant of a patent requires a quid 
pro quo whereby an inventor must sufficiently disclose the invention 
before a patent will be granted.61 This is done in what is known as the 
specification which “shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which 
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same . . . .”62 According to the USPTO, the written description and 
57. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (using the phrase “disclosure to federal agency”). 
58. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1999). 
59. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112, 122. 
60. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012). 
61. Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Tr. Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938) (quoting Permutit Co.
v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 58 (1931)) (“[35 U.S.C. § 112] require[s] the patentee to describe his
invention so that others may construct and use it after the expiration of the patent and ‘to inform the 
public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known
which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not.’”).
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
19
Sandeen: A Typology of Disclosure
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
676 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:657 
enablement requirements of § 112 are separate and distinct requirements, 
with the purpose of the enablement requirement being “to ensure that the 
invention is communicated to the interested public in a meaningful way.63 
When a patent is granted, the publication of the details of the patent 
is a Type-P disclosure because although the information is publicly 
disseminated or available, patent protection continues to attach until the 
patent rights cease or are held invalid. If the patent is not granted, the 
publication of the patent application is a Type-X disclosure because no 
patent rights ever attached to the information, unless the information 
disclosed in the patent application qualifies for trade secret protection.64 
If trade secrets exist in the patent application, then there are two possible 
outcomes. First, if the patent is not granted, and provided the patent 
application is not published, the filing of the patent application is a Type-
C disclosure because the application will be kept confidential. Second, if 
the patent is not granted, but the patent application is published, then it is 
a Type-L disclosure because the publication destroys the trade secrets. 
Another place where the word disclosure is used in the Patent Act is 
in 35 U.S.C. § 102, the provision which specifies that a patent will not be 
granted for an invention that already exists and is disclosed in the prior 
art.65 It is here where disclosure has at least two different meanings, and 
where the applicable concepts of disclosure are sometimes incongruous 
with an information owner’s common understanding of disclosure as 
involving publicness. To the contrary, under patent prior art 
jurisprudence, like trade secret law, it is possible for an act to be treated 
as prior art even though it does not result in the public dissemination of 
the patentable invention. Pursuant to the Metallizing Engineering 
doctrine, for instance, a patent owner’s acts of using an invention in 
private in a manner that does not actually disclose the invention to the 
public can forfeit patent protection.66 As explained in Metallizing 
Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co.: 
[I]t is a condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not
exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he
must content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly. . . . [I]f he
63. U.S. Patent Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2164, The
Enablement Requirement. 
64. Some might argue that the publication constitutes a Type-L disclosure because the
information could have remained as a protected trade secret but for the publication of the application 
in the Official Gazette. However, I contend that trade secret rights were waived by the patent applicant 
upon filing the application, so long as no duty to keep the application confidential applies. 
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1990). 
66. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946). 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/5
2020] A TYPOLOGY OF DISCLOSURE 677 
goes beyond the [grace period without filing a patent application], he 
forfeits his right regardless of how little the public may have learned 
about the invention.67 
Similarly, in Egbert v. Lippman, the Supreme Court considered whether 
the use of corset-stays by the inventor’s girlfriend for a period over two 
years constituted a patentability-destroying public use even though the 
invention was not actually visible to members of the public.68 It did. Thus, 
U.S. patent law’s conception of disclosure is like trade secret law’s 
conception;69 a patentability-disqualifying disclosure can occur when no 
information is actually revealed to members of the public. 
Inventions are not considered novel under § 102 if, prior to the 
effective filing date of the subject patent application, they were: patented, 
described in a printed publication, in public use, on sale, or otherwise 
available to the public. While the word disclosure is nowhere to be found 
in § 102(a), all the listed types of prior art require some degree of 
disclosure. As Robert Merges has detailed, there are several different 
definitions of (patent-disqualifying) disclosure under patent law that range 
from “widespread dissemination” on one end of the spectrum of 
disclosure to merely “a move away from complete secrecy.”70 Which 
patent definition of disclosure applies often depends upon who is 
engaging in the act of disclosure and the form and manner of the 
disclosure. For important policy reasons, the acts of the inventor 
(information owner/holder) are more likely to be treated as patent 
disqualifying disclosures than if those same acts are engaged in by a third 
party, even if the acts of the inventor do not result in a public disclosure 
of the subject information. 
Although § 102(a) does not contain the word disclosure, subsection 
(b) uses it multiple times and in different ways, thereby underscoring the
need to keep the different concepts of disclosure under information law in
mind when determining the legal effect of whichever acts of disclosure
occurred. For instance, in the first instance of use of the word disclosure
in § 102(b)(1)(A), the word disclosure is used alone to describe acts that,
if occurring one year or less before the effective filing date of the subject
application, will not be counted as prior art (specifically disclosures made
by an inventor or joint inventor). In this context, disclosure is a catch-all
67. Id. at 520 (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, [27 U.S. 1] (1829)).
68. Id. at 336. 
69. Camilla A. Hrdy & Sharon K. Sandeen, The Trade Secrecy Standard for Patent Prior Art, 
70 AM. U. L. REV. 1269(2021). 
70. Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1023 (2012). 
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phrase for the list of prior art in § 102(a).71 For purposes of patent law, 
these can be labeled Type-P disclosures because there is still an ability to 
protect the disclosed information if a patent application is timely filed, but 
for purposes of trade secret law they are either Type-C or Type-L 
disclosures depending upon whether they were made pursuant to a duty 
of confidence. 
The second time the word disclosure is used in § 102(b)(1) is in 
subsection (B), but there it is used multiple times; three times alone and 
one time in conjunction with the word publicly. It reads: 
A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a 
claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under 
subsection (a)(1) if— . . . 
(B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been
publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who
obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the
inventor or a joint inventor.
Again, reading the word disclosure in context, when it is used alone it 
must mean the same thing as it meant in § 102(b)(1)(A), as a reference to 
all the types of prior art that are set forth in § 102(a). The use of the phrase 
“publicly disclosed” in § 102(b)(1)(B) then makes sense; it acknowledges 
longstanding U.S. patent law principles that some patent prior art has not 
been publicly disclosed as that phrase is commonly understood and that 
the required act of the inventor must result in a truly “public” disclosure. 
In turn, this reading means the language “otherwise available to the 
public” in § 102(a) does not mean the same thing as “publicly available,” 
but encompasses the broader conception of how information is deemed 
available to the public that is a part of U.S. patent (and, indeed, trade 
secret) jurisprudence. In short, disclosure in the patent prior art context 
does not require publicness. 
C. Copyright Law
United States copyright law is another area of information law where
different conceptions of disclosure exist, but copyright disclosure 
jurisprudence is obscured by four interrelated facts. First, the U.S. 
Copyright Act, although lengthy and detailed, does not use the word 
disclosure much and usually only in the attributive sense. In fact, the 
71. US PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2152.04, 
“The Meaning of ‘Disclosure.’” 
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words “disclosure” or “disclose” are used less than ten times throughout 
the lengthy statute. Instead, the principal terms of art that are used in the 
Copyright Act which relate to disclosing acts and the public availability 
of copyright materials are: publication, published, unpublished, and 
public domain. Second, of the terms just listed, only publication is defined 
in the statute, although unpublished obliviously means that which is not 
the subject of a publication as defined.72 Third, while publication remains 
an important concept under U.S. copyright law, it was more important 
before January 1, 1978 when the 1976 Copyright Act became effective 
and before March 1, 1989 when U.S. copyright law provided that 
copyrights did not attach to works of authorship that were published (as 
defined) without the requisite notice of copyright.73 Finally, the deposit 
requirement of U.S. Copyright Act requires disclosure of copyright 
protected works, but with applicable regulations that allow for specified 
works (or portions of work) to be kept secret or confidential.74 
From the foregoing, it is possible for a single copyright protected 
work to consist of three types of information: (1) public domain 
information (unprotected Type-X information); (2) publicly disclosed, but 
Type-P information (that which is within the scope of copyright 
protection); and (3) secret information which is not made part of the 
deposit of the copyright protected work (Type-P or Type-C). Indeed, it is 
common for computer software to be comprised of all three types of 
information. However, whether Type-C information exists in a copyright 
protected work depends, in addition to the deposit rules, on whether the 
information is published and, if not, whether the information was shared 
with others pursuant to an obligation of confidentiality. If information in 
a work is published such that it becomes generally known or readily 
ascertainable, then the publication is a Type-L disclosure. But in contrast 
to the broad meanings of disclosure under patent and trade secrets law, 
the meaning of published under copyright law is narrower than its 
commonly understood meaning. 
Before January 1, 1978, copyrights in the U.S. did not automatically 
attach to works of authorship fixed in tangible form as they have since,75 
72. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
73. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, § 9. 
74. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.19–202.24. See also, Diane L. Zimmerman, Trade Secrets and the
‘Philosophy’ of Copyright: A Case of Culture Crash, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE 
SECRECY 299 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 
(discussing the traditional disclosure purposes of U.S. copyright law). 
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990). 
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but only attached when a work was published with notice76 or registered.77 
This meant that unpublished and unregistered works were not protected 
by federal copyright law but may have been protected by common law. 
Thus, particularly for works that were unregistered, the definition of 
publication under U.S. copyright law was very important because it 
determined if copyrights in the work even existed. Publication was also a 
very important concept for those who may have published their works 
before March 1, 1989 without the requisite copyright notice because, if 
the work was deemed to be published without such notice, copyright 
protection was lost.78 
Not surprisingly, because the pre-March 1, 1989 copyright notice 
requirement worked a forfeiture of rights, the jurisprudence surrounding 
the meaning of publication before March 1, 1989 limited its meaning (and 
by extension, the meaning of copyright disclosures) by distinguishing 
between acts of “general publication” and acts of “limited publication.”79 
Then, in 1976, when a statutory definition of publication was finally 
added to U.S. copyright law, similar distinctions and limitations were 
codified.80 
76. Copyright Act of 1909 § 9. 
77. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60–349, 35 Stat. 1075, §§ 10–11. 
78. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899) (finding the lack of separate copyright notice 
on essays in a magazine placed essays in the public domain); Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903) 
(finding the lack of separate copyright notice on installments of a book published in a magazine placed 
book in the public domain).  
79. White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746–47 (9th Cir. 1952) (“[A] limited publication which
communicates the contents of a manuscript to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, 
and without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale, is considered a ‘limited 
publication,’ which does not result in loss of the author’s common-law right to his manuscript; but 
that the circulation must be restricted both as to persons and purpose, or it cannot be called a private 
or limited publication.”); Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1904) 
(“Publication of a subject of copyright is effected by its communication or dedication to the public. 
Such a publication is what is known as a ‘general publication.’ There may be also a ‘limited 
publication.’”). 
80. Copyright Act of 1909 § 9. See also, H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 3 (1976),
https://www.copyright.gov/history/law/clrev_94-1476.pdf [https://perma.cc/E739-3ZNY] (Under the 
definition in § 101, a work is “published” if one or more copies or phonorecords embodying it are 
distributed to the public-that is, generally to persons under no explicit or implicit restrictions with 
respect to disclosure of its contents-without regard to the manner in which the copies or phonorecords 
changed hands. The definition clears up the question of whether the sale of phonorecords constitutes 
publication, and it also makes plain that any form or dissemination in which a material object does 
not change hands-performances or displays on television, for example-is not a publication no matter 
how many people are exposed to the work. On the other hand, the definition also makes clear that, 
when copies or phonorecords are offered to a group of wholesalers, broadcasters, motion pictures, 
etc., publication takes place if the purpose is “further distribution, public performance, or public 
display.”).  
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/5
2020] A TYPOLOGY OF DISCLOSURE 681 
The definition of publication (or published) under U.S. copyright law 
post the 1978 and 1989 changes to the law remain important because the 
Copyright Act is replete with provisions that treat published and 
unpublished works differently.81 But importantly for purposes of this 
article, publication under current U.S. copyright law does not necessarily 
mean public disclosure, particularly of the widespread variety. Rather, 
(and in contrast to the patent law concept of prior art, discussed above), 
the applicable definition of publication has been interpreted to be 
narrower than the common understanding of the meaning of disclosure. 
Section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act, defines publication as: 
[T]he distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The
offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display,
constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does
not of itself constitute publication.82
On the face of this statutory definition, one can see the requirement of a 
sale or other transfer of ownership that is not generally required for public 
disclosures of information. As explained by one copyright law scholar: 
“[A] sine qua non of publication should be the acquisition by members of 
the public of a possessory interest in tangible copies of the work in 
question.”83 As a result, U.S. copyright law’s definition of publication 
does not apply to all works that have been publicly disclosed or 
disseminated. Indeed, under U.S. copyright law, posting a work of 
authorship on the Internet does not constitute a publication,84 whereas 
such an act would likely be considered a public disclosure under trade 
secret law.85 
Importantly, publication under current U.S. copyright law (or any 
other type of disclosure of a copyright protected work) does not mean the 
loss of applicable copyrights, although publication can affect the scope of 
those rights. Rather, the loss of copyrights under U.S. copyright law is 
81. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2005); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2008). 
82. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
83. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.07[A] 
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed., 2021). 
84. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 101 (3d 
ed. 2017) (“As a general rule, the Office does not consider a work to be published if it is merely 
displayed or performed online, unless the author or copyright owner clearly authorized the 
reproduction or distribution of that work, or clearly offered to distribute the work to a group of 
intermediaries for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display.”). 
85. See Rowe, supra note 50. 
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typically denoted by the phrase “in the public domain” which—making 
copyright law’s disclosure jurisprudence even more confusing—doesn’t 
require public dissemination at all but is a term of art that signifies that 
copyrights in a work never existed or have come to an end. 
Usually, copyrights come to an end because the applicable copyright 
term has ended, but authors of works can also announce that they dedicate 
their works to the public domain by waiving their copyrights. 
Additionally, although expressed in an otherwise copyright protected 
work, copyrights never exist in information, whether published or not, that 
is not within the scope of copyrighted subject matter. This would include 
facts and anything else not protected by copyright law as specified in 
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act. In both cases, the work (or unprotected
portions of the work) is in the public domain in the sense that it can be
freely copied by the public, not in the sense that it has been publicly
disseminated. Thus, it is possible for a U.S. author to write a novel, keep
it secret for her life plus seventy years, and it still will enter the public
domain without ever being published or publicly disclosed.
Although the public domain is a term of art in intellectual property 
law that means information is not protected by intellectual property law, 
often it is used in common (and scholarly) vernacular to refer to 
information that has been publicly disclosed.86 In such cases, care must 
be undertaken to determine if the term is being used in the intellectual 
property sense to mean information that is no longer protected by law or, 
in the more colloquial sense, to mean information that has been publicly 
disclosed. In the context of U.S. copyright law, the words that should be 
used to connote public disclosure are either “publication” or “published,” 
but as noted, copyright law has its own particular meaning of publication 
that does not comport one-for-one with an information owner/holder’s 
common understanding of disclosure. This is yet another reason why a 
typology of disclosure is needed. 
IV. A PROPOSED TYPOLOGY OF DISCLOSURE
The foregoing examination of disclosure principles under various 
areas of information law does not provide an obvious answer to the 
question of how we should define (or redefine) disclosure. However, it is 
86. See, e.g., Coton v. Televised Visual X-Ography, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla.
2010). See also Monica Gaudio, Copyright Infringement and Me, LIVEJOURNAL.COM (Nov. 3rd, 
2010, 11:14 pm), https://illadore.livejournal.com/30674.html [https://perma.cc/34GR-HYNE] 
(“Instead, the editor informed [Ms. Gaudio] that ‘the web is considered public domain’, and that [she] 
should be happy [Cooks Source] didn’t ‘lift’ [her] whole article and put someone else’s name on it!”). 
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important that we try because there is too much misunderstanding and 
confusion between an information owner/holder’s common 
understanding of the meaning of disclosure and the legal effect of various 
disclosing acts. This misunderstanding and confusion often lead to the 
assertion of actual or threatened harm that is factually inapplicable, often 
occupying the court’s time and attention when it shouldn’t. 
As has been shown, in certain areas of information law there is a 
strong public policy that favors the waiver of applicable protections 
whenever an information owner voluntarily discloses information to a 
third-party, regardless of whether the information becomes generally 
known or publicly available; in others, there is agreement that certain 
types of information are deserving of continued legal protection even if 
they are disclosed to the public or, at least, readily available to it; and, 
some information law doctrines recognize that certain types of 
information are not protected by law even if they are kept secret and 
confidential. How should we differentiate between these legal effects? 
Borrowing from the idea of a “taxonomy of privacy,”87 rather than 
improve or change the existing definitions and usages of the word 
disclosure under law, this article proposes a typology that distinguishes 
between acts that result in the loss of applicable rights in information and 
acts that do not. Specifically, as previewed above, five different types of 
disclosure with new descriptive labels are proposed that, consistent with 
the various ways that the word disclosure is used in information law, 
connote different legal circumstances and effects. They are: 
1. Type-L disclosures: Acts that lead to the loss (or waiver) of
associated legal rights in the disclosed information.
Type-L disclosures include all the ways that applicable rights in 
information are lost, including situations where regulated entities and 
public contractors are required to disclose specified information 
(including trade secrets and confidential information) to the government 
as a regulatory condition or a condition of doing business. These are the 
types of disclosure that worry information owners/holders the most and 
that are most legitimate to be raised in a court of law but that are often not 
improper. 
87. Solove, supra note 15, at 485 (“[T]he goal [of this taxonomy] is simply to define the
activities [that affect privacy] and explain why and how they can cause trouble. The question of when 
and how the law should regulate can only be answered in each specific context in which the question 
arises.”). 
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2. Type-P disclosures: Acts, often associated with patent and copyright
law but that may also apply in other contexts, that result in the public
dissemination or availability of information but that do not result in the
loss of any associated rights in the subject information.
The letter “P” stands for “protected,” meaning the subject information is 
protected by a body of information law (to what extent and under which 
circumstances are different questions) even after the information is 
disclosed to others or publicly. In addition to patent rights and copyrights, 
Type-P disclosures would include information that is required to be 
submitted to government regulators and becomes public but is the subject 
of applicable data exclusivity rights that restrict certain uses of the 
information.88 It does not include information that is protected by contract, 
because that information is a Type-C disclosure. 
3. Type-C disclosures: Acts that do not lead to the loss of associated
legal rights because the sharing of information occurs between persons
and entities that owe an obligation of confidentiality imposed by law,
court order, or contract.
The sharing of trade secrets and other confidential information would be 
classified as a Type-C disclosure provided the subject information is 
confidential or secret and an obligation of confidentiality is established 
before the sharing occurs. If no such obligation of confidentiality exists 
before sharing, then the act of sharing is likely to constitute a Type-L 
disclosure if the information was protected by law before it was shared. 
This is the category that best describes confidential information that is 
shared pursuant to a Protective Order or a Non-disclosure Agreement 
(NDA). Sometimes, however, information that is the subject of a 
Protective Order or an NDA does not have legal protection beyond factual 
confidentiality or applicable privilege and should properly be labeled 
Type-X information (see below). 
4. Type-T disclosures: Acts that result in the mere transfer of
information, either in analog or digital form, but that do not result in the
transferred information being read by the transferee.
This category of disclosure has not yet been explicitly recognized by law 
but is needed to differentiate between: (a) information which is shared 
such that knowledge is or could be acquired by another; and (b) the mere 
transfer (often electronically) of information from one place to another. 
88. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
Annex 1C, art. 39.3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M 1197 (1994).  
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For this purpose, the word transfer is defined as “to convey or remove 
from one place or one person to another; to pass or hand over from one to 
another.”89 Thus, this category could cover information that is stored on 
third-party servers in the Cloud or in old-school banker’s boxes or file 
cabinets kept at a third-party storage site.90 Often these business 
relationships do not involve express or implied promises of confidentiality 
that would allow the transfers of information to be described as Type-C 
disclosures, so a different label is needed. However, if there is a breach of 
the storage facility, there is a possibility that the information will suffer a 
Type-L disclosure. 
5. Type-X disclosures: This category of disclosures focuses more on
the type of information and its legal status, rather than the act of
disclosure. It is applicable to acts of disclosure involving information
that is not protected by law for one reason or another. This would
include, for instance: information that is not within the scope of
protected information, information that is in the public domain because
applicable protections have expired, information that is generally known 
or readily ascertainable, and information that constitutes prior art under
patent law.
This final type of disclosure is needed to capture the default rule that 
information is not protected by law unless the law says it is. Unless 
information is protected by an area of information law (for instance, trade 
secret, patent, copyright, or privacy law), the law does not provide a 
remedy for the unwanted disclosure of that information. Indeed, the strong 
public policy of the U.S. is to facilitate the dissemination and use of 
information because information is needed to spur creativity and 
invention. The owners/holders of Type-X information can always engage 
in self-help to protect it, but if it leaks out they have no standing to 
complain because, due to the public policy that favors information 
diffusion and knowledge acquisition, society doesn’t care about the 
unwanted disclosure of legally unprotected information, even if the 
information owner/holder subjectively believed that the information was 
its secret or confidential information. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW TO USE THE TYPOLOGY
The best way to use the suggested typology is to require information 
owners/holders to designate the type of information and information 
89. Id. 
90. Sandeen, supra note 13.
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disclosures that are involved in litigation or other settings where they may 
be required or compelled to disclose information. The focus of the labels 
is mostly on the character of the disclosure, not the type of information, 
except for Type-P and Type-X disclosures which concern the type of legal 
protection involved; for instance, patent, copyright, trade secret, data 
exclusivity, or none. Just the effort undertaken to label information should 
clarify the nature of the designated information, even if more than one 
designation might plausibly apply to the subject information. If multiple 
designations apply, litigants and courts will know that they are likely 
dealing with overlapping rights, which must be sorted through. 
From the standpoint of the over-assertion of information rights, and 
with the rhetorical power of theft in mind, a designation that information 
as either Type-P or Type-X should quickly dispel any fears of improper 
disclosure because no rights in the information can be lost. But note that 
a determination of whether an information owner/holder’s or a third 
party’s previous disclosures rendered information Type-X (no protection) 
will require application of applicable information law and the multiple 
types of protection destroying acts that may apply to the subject 
information, including the broad definitions of disclosure under trade 
secret and patent law. It is unlikely that an information owner/holder will 
readily admit that its information is Type-X, even if it is, requiring a court 
to assess that issue. 
Type-C disclosures should not be of major concern to courts and 
litigants because they will be undertaken pursuant to applicable duties of 
confidentiality, including those imposed by Protective Orders and NDAs. 
The critical issues will be determining: (1) if a duty of confidentiality 
exists and is enforceable; and (2) the scope of the duty of confidentiality. 
This should include a determination of whether the subject information is 
indeed confidential, but often duties of confidentiality are agreed to, or 
Protective Orders are issued, without a detailed assessment of this issue. 
Typically, if an information owner treats information as confidential, it 
will be treated as such initially, but subject to later factual findings as part 
of a breach of confidentiality claim. 
If a breach of confidentiality is later alleged, the critical questions 
will be whether the information was and remained confidential. If not, the 
information would lose its confidential status either because 
confidentiality did not exist when the Protective Order was issued or the 
NDA was agreed to (a Type-X disclosure), or confidentiality was 
subsequently lost (a Type-L disclosure). Information owners, often allege 
a Type-L disclosure when seeking monetary damages in trade secret and 
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breach of contract cases, but whether they will prevail on their claims 
depends upon the confidential and secret status of the subject information. 
Under current trade secret principles, Type-T disclosures may result 
in the loss of information rights if reasonable efforts to protect such 
information are not undertaken. However, if the law evolves to recognize 
a distinction between the disclosure or sharing of information and a “mere 
transfer” of such information, then it might be argued that Type-T 
disclosures do not result in a loss of any associated information rights. 
This is because, as noted above, arguably, Type-L disclosures do not 
involve cognition by the recipient of the information. If more disclosing 
activities are involved, then a confidentiality obligation should have been 
established before there was any transfer or sharing of information. Since 
what might be labeled Type-T disclosures are initiated by the information 
owner/holder, they should not be heard to complain about the 
consequences of their own voluntary actions if a court deems their actions 
to be of the Type-L variety. 
It is only Type-L disclosures, or the threat of Type-L disclosures, that 
legitimately involve the loss of information rights. But because the 
information involved will often fall into the Type-P or Type X categories, 
a determination of the protected status of the information should always 
be made early. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates how the word disclosure and disclosing 
activities vary in different areas of law (focusing on patent, copyright, and 
trade secret law) and why it is important to understand and correctly apply 
the different meanings and concepts. The principal concern is that 
information owners spend a lot of time, energy, and court resources 
arguing that their rights in information will be lost when in many cases 
such an assertion is untrue because: (1) the information is not protected 
by any law; (2) the information will be protected by patent or copyright 
law even if disclosed; (3) the disclosure is actually a mere transfer of 
information; or (4) a Protective Order or other confidentiality obligation 
will suffice to protect the information. To make it easier for litigants and 
courts to determine when the potential loss of information is truly a 
concern, this article sets forth a typology of disclosure that differentiates 
between various disclosing activities. Although presented with respect to 
the intellectual property laws that are discussed, the typology should be 
useful in any context where acts of disclosure are discussed. 
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